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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kent Ostler filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging, in part, that
his guilty plea was the product of his trial counsel’s manipulation as counsel told
Mr. Ostler that he could not get a psychosexual evaluation until after he pled guilty. The
district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal. In dismissing this claim,
the court held that Mr. Ostler failed to support the claim with an affidavit or testimony
from his trial counsel. Mr. Ostler asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
summarily dismissing this claim.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In September of 2012, Kent Ostler pled guilty to one count of lewd conduct with a
minor; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss a persistent violator enhancement
allegation, but there was no sentencing agreement.

(R., p.47.)

Mr. Ostler was

sentenced to a unified term of 30 years, with 10 year fixed, and his sentence was
affirmed on appeal. (R., p.27.)
Acting pro se, Mr. Ostler filed a timely Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction
Relief.

(R., pp.4-11.)

In his petition, Mr. Ostler asserted, in part, that “Counsel

manipulated Petitioner into pleading guilty by telling Petitioner he had to plead guilty in
order to do the evaluation.” (R., p.6.) He alleged that “The Prosecutor along with
counsel, told Petitioner that in order to do the evaluation he had to plead guilty” … “[a]nd
that if Petitioner was considered a low risk that a plea deal for a sentence would be
negotiated.” (R., p.7.)

Mr. Ostler claimed that the “Prosecutor had no intention of

negotiating with Petitioner for a sentence, it was only a ploy to get Petitioner to plead
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guilty and ask for the maximum sentence.”

(R., p.7.)

In his supporting affidavit,

Mr. Ostler swore that “Had Petitioner had an effective attorney, Petitioner would have
proceeded to trial,” that “Petitioner was told that in order to get the evaluation that
Petitioner had to enter a plea of guilty,” and that, “Petitioner was also told that if
Petitioner was deemed a low risk that a deal in regards to sentence would be made.”
(R., p.10.) Mr. Ostler also swore that, “Petitioner would have not entered a plea of guilty
had [he] not been manipulated” and that he “was manipulated into pleading guilty by his
attorney and the prosecutor.” (R., pp.10-11.) The district court granted Mr. Ostler’s
request for appointed counsel. (R., pp.12-15, 24.)
The State filed an Answer in which it denied Mr. Ostler’s substantive claims, and
in which it asserted affirmative defenses in general terms, but not specific to any
particular claims. (R., pp.26-30.) The State attached to its Answer a copy of the written
plea agreement, a copy of the district court’s Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty
plea, which was entered prior Mr. Ostler’s sentencing hearing, and a transcript of the
entry of plea hearing. (R., pp.31-52.) The State eventually filed a motion for summary
dismissal “on the grounds and for the reasons set forth in the State’s Verified Answer to
Petition For Post Conviction Relief[.]” (R., pp.59-60.)
After a hearing, the district court entered an Order Granting Respondent’s Motion
for Summary Disposition. (R., pp.64-78.) Regarding Mr. Ostler’s claim that “he was told
that to get the ‘evaluation,’1 [he] had to enter a plea of guilty,” the district court held as
follows,

During the hearing, counsel for Mr. Ostler confirmed that the “evaluation” Mr. Ostler
was referring to in his pro se filings, was the Psychosexual Evaluation. (Tr., p.8, Ls.1019.)

1
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Ostler did not offer an affidavit from [trial counsel] or anyone else to
support this conclusory allegation. At the hearing, counsel for Ostler
argued that [trial counsel] should be questioned under oath about this
alleged statement by [trial counsel]. [Trial counsel] could have been
subpoenaed to testify at the hearing on the State's Motion. In addition, the
question could have been put to [trial counsel] by way of a deposition or
request for an affidavit. Mere conclusory statements, without more, will
not raise an issue of fact.
(R., p.73.)

Mr. Ostler filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s final

judgment. (R., pp.79-84.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal of
Mr. Ostler’s claim that his guilty plea was not voluntary, because there exists a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether his guilty plea was a product of his counsel’s
manipulation?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Granting The State’s Motion For Summary Dismissal Of
Mr. Ostler’s Claim That His Guilty Plea Was Not Voluntary, Because There Exists A
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact As To Whether His Guilty Plea Was A Product Of His
Counsel’s Manipulation
A.

Introduction
Mr. Ostler filed a verified petition and a notarized affidavit in which he swore that

his trial counsel manipulated him into pleading guilty by telling him he could not get a
psychosexual evaluation prior to entering his guilty plea and that, but for his counsel’s
manipulation, he would not have pled guilty but would have taken his case to trial. The
State did not present any evidence rebutting this claim. Because Mr. Ostler raised a
genuine issue of material fact, which was not rebutted by the State, the district court
erred in summarily dismissing this claim.
B.

Standards Of Review
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature, and like a

plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her allegations upon which the
requests for relief are based by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac,
145 Idaho 437, 443 (2008). However, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original
post-conviction petition must allege more than merely “a short and plain statement of
the claim.”

Id. at 443-444.

The application must present or be accompanied by

admissible evidence supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the postconviction petition may be subject to dismissal. Id. In addition, the post-conviction
petition must set forth with specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is
based. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010).
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A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through
post-conviction proceedings. Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 769, 185 P.3d 921, 925
(Ct. App. 2008). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
must first show that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,
760 (1988). Where a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is
shown if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, at 694; Aragon at
760. Where a petitioner claims that his guilty plea was induced by the erroneous advice
of counsel, the petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s erroneous advice, the
petitioner would not have entered into the plea agreement. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 59-60 (1985).
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the
petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact
that, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, would entitle him or her to the relief requested.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. “A material fact has ‘some logical connection with the
consequential facts[,]’ Black’s Law Dictionary, 991 (7th Ed.1999), and therefore is
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties.” Id. On
review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary
hearing, the appellate court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.
Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct. App. 1993). “‘[W]here the evidentiary facts are
not disputed and the trial court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary
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judgment is appropriate, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the
court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those inferences.’”
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444 (quoting Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519
(1982).) Furthermore,
“When an action is to be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion
for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most
probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.”
Id. (quoting Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437 (1991).)
The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for whether there
exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry
of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words, there are
any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at
250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted.
Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner “must be
regarded as true” for purposes of summary dismissal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho
247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party,
and “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of
the non-moving party.” Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).
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C.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Ostler’s Claim That His
Guilty Plea Was The Product Of His Trial Counsel Manipulating Him As Trial
Counsel Told Mr. Ostler He Could Not Get A Psychosexual Evaluation Prior To
Pleading Guilty
Through his verified petition and his affidavit in support, Mr. Ostler claimed, inter

alia, the following: “The Prosecutor along with counsel, told Petitioner that in order to do
the evaluation he had to plead guilty” … “[a]nd that if Petitioner was considered a low
risk that a plea deal for a sentence would be negotiated”; “Had Petitioner had an
effective attorney, Petitioner would have proceeded to trial”; “Petitioner was told that in
order to get the evaluation that Petitioner had to enter a plea of guilty”; “Petitioner was
also told that if Petitioner was deemed a low risk that a deal in regards to sentence
would be made”; “Petitioner would have not entered a plea of guilty had [he] not been
manipulated”; and, “Petitioner was manipulated into pleading guilty by his attorney and
the prosecutor.” (R., pp.7-11.) The State provided no evidence to rebut Mr. Ostler’s
claims.
The district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal based upon
its finding that Mr. Ostler failed to present a sworn statement from his trial counsel
verifying his claims. (R., p.73.) This is not the correct standard. Summary dismissal is
appropriate only where the petition and evidence supporting the petition fail to raise a
genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, would entitle him
or her to the relief requested. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. If indeed Mr. Ostler’s plea
was based upon a false statement by his trial counsel that he could not get a
psychosexual evaluation unless he pled guilty knowing that the outcome of the
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evaluation would have an impact on the sentencing recommendations,2 he could be
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1985).
Because the State failed to rebut Mr. Ostler’s claim that he was manipulated into
pleading guilty by his counsel’s objectively false statement that he could not participate
in a psychosexual evaluation unless he pled guilty, summary dismissal was not
appropriate. Thus, the district court erred by granting the State’s motion for summary
dismissal.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ostler respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order
granting the State’s motion for summary disposition and remand his case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his guilty plea was manipulated by his
attorney’s false advice.
DATED this 28th day of June, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Mr. Ostler acknowledged when he entered his guilty plea that the plea agreement did
not include any agreed upon sentencing recommendations. (See R., pp.32, 47.) This is
not dispositive, however, for two reasons. First, the fact that the parties did not agree
upon a sentencing recommendation prior to the entry of the plea does not conclusively
demonstrate that the parties did not anticipate the possibility of later agreeing upon a
sentencing recommendation in light of the evaluator’s conclusions. Second, the district
court did not dismiss Mr. Ostler’s claim that his guilty plea was manipulated by trial
counsel based upon any finding that Mr. Ostler failed to demonstrate prejudice.
2
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